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GUE S T ED I TOR I A L
Decisional capacity: toward an inclusionary approach
Introduction
Capacity, defined as the ability to make one’s own
decisions, has traditionally been seen as a dicho-
tomous or categorical construct. People either have
capacity, and are therefore afforded autonomy, or
they lack capacity, and are therefore provided with
a proxy decision-maker. In a way this concept – and
the related practice of conceptualizing capacity as
an all or nothing phenomenon – resembles the situ-
ation of Kafka’s protagonist Gregor Samsa inMeta-
morphosis (1972 (in German 1915)). The opening
lines of this breathtaking essay are world famous.
In English they run as follows: “As Gregor Samsa
awoke one morning from uneasy dreams he found
himself transformed in his bed into a gigantic in-
sect.” As a consequence of this categorical change,
Gregor is excluded and despised of. He is no longer
considered an agent and ends up squashed by apples
by his own relatives.
Although the parallel may seem far-fetched,
the atmosphere of estrangement and alienation re-
sembles what can happen to people who are dia-
gnosed with dementia or other mental disorders,
when suddenly their health professionals turn to
their relatives to make healthcare and other de-
cisions and they themselves are no longer afforded
a role – read for example Maarten’s experience in
Bernlef’s novelOut ofMind (1989 (inDutch 1984)).
Fortunately, this situation is changing and we
are moving toward a more sophisticated approach,
away from a categorical and exclusionary prac-
tice toward a more dimensional and inclusionary
concept of capacity. One of the fundamental ideas
underlying this alternative approach is that capa-
city assessments should primarily be undertaken not
to judge whether people are capable or not to de-
cide “autonomously,” but rather to assess what kind
of support people with decision-making disabilities
(DMD) need in order to be involved in decision-
making and thus to promote their autonomy.
This paradigm shift has been heralded by a
number of human rights frameworks such as the
European Convention on Human Rights and the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of People
with Disabilities (UNCORPD, 2012). These con-
ventions promote autonomy and the enjoyment of
equal recognition before the law for people with
disabilities, thus underscoring the right of people
with disabilities to enjoy legal capacity on an equal
basis with other members of society. Importantly,
UNCORPD Article 12 (2012) specifically recom-
mends that signatories “take appropriate measures
to provide access by persons with disabilities to the
support they may require in exercising their legal
capacity.”
This obligation translates into a major challenge
for healthcare and legal professionals alike. How
do we support maximum participation in decision-
making for those who lack decisional capacity?
Some years ago, Beltram (1996) summarized the
challenge of accurately assessing decisional capa-
city, referring to the usefulness of “pragmatic mod-
els of shared decision-making.” However, there is
no consensus yet as to how models of supported
decision-making might be utilized by people with
DMD.
In this contribution we propose a practical model
for supported decision-making, which is inclusion-
ary and founded in ethical and human rights frame-
works. To this end we will first discuss how the
ethical concept of autonomy has evolved during the
past decades and how changing views on autonomy
relate to support in decision-making.
The concept of autonomy and its evolution
The rise of autonomy in bioethics and health law
dates back to the 1970s and is closely linked with
the movement for patient rights and criticism of
medical paternalism. It is important to note, how-
ever, that this “new kid on the block in medical eth-
ics” – to quote Faden and Beauchamp (1996, p.94
et passim) – was introduced without proper guid-
ance, nor was it preceded by relevant empirical re-
search on what patients expect from their physicians
when it comes to health-related decision-making.
Instead, the plea for a central role of autonomy in
medical ethics was largely based on philosophical
and legal arguments under the assumption that the
right to independent choice would be welcomed and
embraced by all patients.
This, however, was not exactly what happened.
What did happen was that physicians increas-
ingly marginalized their role in the decision-
making process, restricting themselves to objectively
presenting patients with options and odds, while
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withholding their own experience and recommend-
ations out of fear of overly influencing patients
(Quill and Brody, 1996). This attitude was based
on the assumption that the physician’s exercise of
power and influence inevitably compromises the pa-
tient’s freedom of choice and thus discourages act-
ive persuasion by the physician in the face of dif-
ferences of opinion between physician and patient
(Quill and Brody, 1996). As a result, however, pa-
tients more or less felt that mandatory autonomy
was posed upon them; what they missed was the
provision of advice and adequate support from their
health professionals in making difficult decisions
(Loewy, 2005; Kim, 2010).
In the course of the 1990s, new ethical discourses
on the role of autonomy, which were more in-
spired by empirical research into patient perspect-
ives, began to gain ground. It became clear that, in
moving from the paternalistic model to the inde-
pendent choice model, medical ethics had wrongly,
and not for the patient’s benefit, endorsed a form of
stark autonomy as the highest value (Loewy, 2005).
The effect of this move away from the paternalistic
model was that the perils of coercion were avoided
at the cost of exposing the patient to the perils of
abandonment. It became clear that a new balance
had to be sought, based on a more nuanced ap-
proach of autonomy (Kon, 2009).
Relevant to this search for a new balance are
studies that try to reconcile the principle of re-
spect for autonomywith real life situations of human
(inter)dependency. Thus, authors like Agich (1993;
2003), Taylor (1997), and Tronto (1993), writing
from different but affiliated philosophical perspect-
ives, have called attention to the relational aspects
of autonomy. Agich and Taylor distinguish between
negative and positive concepts of autonomy, and
Tronto stresses the relevance of the caregiving re-
lationship in promoting autonomy. By focusing ex-
clusively on negative autonomy in terms of non-
interference, medical ethics tends to reduce respect
for autonomy to merely offering patients the op-
portunity for self-governance and allowing them “a
right to be left alone” (Agich, 2003, p. 25). This
negative conceptualization of autonomy reflects the
human condition in a very distorted way. Specific-
ally, it neglects our interdependency. People are
neither born as self-governing individuals nor can
they flourish as a person without the support of oth-
ers. Our autonomy is always relative and has relev-
ant relational and developmental aspects.
These are referred to in positive concepts of
autonomy. For example, when it is said that
autonomy means living life according to standards
we can call our own, reference is made to a process of
identification and of becoming (i.e., evolving), which
underscores that people do not live their life isolated
from the world and its uncertainties. On the con-
trary, people regularly have to adapt in order to hold
on to a sense of self, notably in relation to import-
ant life events and in adverse circumstances such as
illness. And in doing so, they are in need of others
to support them. A positive concept of autonomy
further allows for degrees of autonomy and un-
derscores, when it comes to (complex) decision-
making, that providing support in arriving at a de-
cision, for people with or without capacity alike, is
not only necessary but can be achieved without im-
posing one’s will. What decision support specifically
aims at is guiding and allowing the other/patient
to arrive at a decision he or she can identify with
(Agich, 1993; 2003; Tronto, 1993), retaining own-
ership of the decision.
A decision-making model that has been sug-
gested to align with this approach to autonomy is
shared decision-making. However, before examin-
ing the appropriateness of this model in the spe-
cific context of people with DMD, two additional
concepts need mentioning, both of which are rel-
evant when it comes to finding the proper balance
between coercion and abandonment in supported
decision-making. The first one is the concept of dig-
nity of risk. The second is the concept of assent.
Dignity of risk
This concept originated in the movement for
the deinstitutionalization of the developmentally
disabled in the 1970s. It is promoted by the UN-
CORPD (2012) and supports the right of individu-
als to choose to take some risk in engaging in life
experiences. In terms of health and treatment/
welfare decisions, dignity of risk requires complex
but often necessary considerations to be made, bal-
ancing the autonomy of the individual and their
rights to engage in otherwise normal life experiences
on one hand, with that of duty of care owed to them
by the health professional. In other words: adequate
decision support must allow for a certain “right to
take risks” instead of taking a strict safety-oriented
and risk-aversive stance.
Assent
The concept of assent in healthcare was derived
from ethical discourse in relation to terminally ill
children and their right to contribute to decisions
regarding their bodies and treatment. The concept
of assent distinguishes approval, or a positive and
voluntary agreement, from the concept of consent,
which is voluntary but requires capacity. Assent
refers to approval of a decision by a person lacking
capacity who is not able to manipulate information
relevant to that decision. Molinari et al. (2004) ad-
apted the concept of assent to older persons lacking
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substantial decision-making capacity. In their view,
a finding of impaired capacity increases the likeli-
hood that the patient will be excluded completely
from the decision-making process. Their concept
of geriatric assent calls upon physicians and con-
cerned proxies or substitute decision-makers to eli-
cit the preferences of older patients lacking capacity,
and to try to gain their affirmation for healthcare
decisions.
From the viewpoint of medical ethics, the
strategy of seeking assent through soliciting ex-
pressions of patient’s preferences and weighing
them in the decision-making process treads the
middle ground between rigidly respecting (negat-
ive) autonomy and paternalism. As such, it can be
seen as an example of how autonomy can be pro-
moted, in a way that is consistent with a positive
approach to autonomy, because it entails a serious
effort to allow patients to identify with the decision
at hand and thus to make the decision also “theirs.”
It does not, however, teach us how to do this and
what decision-making model is most appropriate.
Shared decision-making
Shared decision-making can be defined as a joint
process of decision-making between care profes-
sionals and patients (Brock, 1991; Briss et al.,
2004). This concept is based on a relationship
between the health and social care professional and
the patient, such that the health and social care pro-
fessional helps the patient understand the various
options available for the proposed care/treatment
(including the pros and cons of each option); makes
recommendations to the patient; and helps the pa-
tient base their preference on the best evidence
available (Briss et al., 2004). This process occurs
with reference to what is of value to the patient.
In this model, both the health and social care pro-
fessional and the patient “lay all their cards on the
table” with regard to the proposed treatment, and
then work together to reach a consensus on the pre-
ferred treatment plan.
Thismodel also gives room for patients and phys-
icians to actively exchange ideas, negotiate differ-
ences, and share power and influence to best serve
the patient’s needs. Ideally, the healthcare profes-
sional/patient relationship should be such that the
patient, empowered by the care professional, plays a
maximum part in decisions relating to their care and
treatment. Indeed studies have shown that a good
proportion of patients would prefer this approach
when decisions need to be made about their care
(Deber et al., 1996).
At face value, the concept of shared decision-
making is very attractive and seems a very natural
way of arriving at a joint decision. However, its
translation to everyday clinical practice is not self-
evident. Often there are time constraints that limit
the application of shared decision-making; further,
there is a tendency among patients to be less will-
ing to play an active role in decision-making as their
illness increases in severity (Charles et al., 1997;
Gravel et al., 2006). Finally, patient participation is
highly dependent on cognitive abilities. By defin-
ition, the concept of shared decision-making re-
lies on an equal participation between patients and
physicians and thus has more relevance to patients
with capacity, although many of the principles have
application to patients lacking capacity.
Collaborative decision-making
The concept of collaborative decision-making has
been proposed not as an alternative model to shared
decision-making but as a complementary approach
to what can, in essence, be shared in an ongo-
ing health or social care relationship in which de-
cisions have to be made and acted upon (O’Grady
and Jadad, 2010). Although protagonists of shared
decision-making might be critical here and con-
tend that collaborative decision-making merely ex-
pands onwhat is already included in shared decision-
making, we believe that it is a more flexible model
that still respects principles of autonomy while mak-
ing way for different degrees of patient participation
determined by variable patient willingness or cognit-
ive ability.
Collaboration is a step beyond merely obtain-
ing assent. Collaborative decision-making focuses
less on the who of the decision-making process, but
more on the how as well as on the why of patients
wanting to make a particular decision. Arriving at
decisions through collaboration involves knowledge
building that goes beyond clinical issues through
shared learning and compromise. Here the phys-
ician informs the patient about the treatment op-
tions at stake, while the patient is invited to inform
the physician about what goes on in their life, what
their values are, and their goals, thereby articulating
non-medical factors that are meaningful and con-
tribute to their identity. The treatment decision is
thus reframed within this wider context (O’Grady
and Jadad, 2010).
While shared decision-making refers to the two-
way knowledge exchange relevant to the decision at
hand, collaboration broadens the perspective and
allows for more participants, such as supporters or
assistants, varying from family members to pub-
lic advocates. Also, collaboration is not focused
on decision-making as an event, but as a process
of constructing a care plan. A further effect of
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collaboration might be that the problem to be de-
cided on is reframed/rephrased during the decision-
making process. Finally, collaboration is essential
in the care process, even in the most mundane ele-
ments of caregiving, such as feeding, washing, and
dressing of dementia patients in a nursing home.
Here the values of responsibility and responsiveness
advocated by the ethics of care fully apply (Tronto,
1993).
A truly collaborative approach to decision-
making underscores the relevance of a wider, non-
medical context of patient values and preferences.
Assisting patients to elaborate on their wishes and
on what they consider of relevance in their life can
be seen as an enabling approach to decision-making.
Thus, one seeks to compensate for limitations in
cognitive abilities and communication by address-
ing individual strengths. For example, patients with
dementia are often quite capable of communicating
what they value, and their capacity to understand
can also be far greater when the focus is on exper-
iences, values, and feelings, rather than on recol-
lection and the rational handling of information. By
proceeding in such a way, collaboration in decision-
making can promote patient’s self-esteem and iden-
tity (Hellstrom et al., 2007; De Boer et al., 2012).
Similarly, it has been shown that while some pa-
tients with psychosis have very limited insight into
or refuse to acknowledge their diagnosis, they may
be prepared to accept that they need treatment and
understand the side effects of medication (Aydin
et al., 2013).
Current statutory support for supported
decision-making
Even in the absence of formal laws that codify sup-
ported decision-making, several jurisdictions man-
date, sometimes via policy, consultation with the
person with the disability once a substitute decision
maker has been appointed. For example, in Aus-
tralia, under the NSWGuardianship Act 1987, Sec-
tion 4 Principles, it is the duty of a substitute de-
cision maker exercising functions under the Act to
(i) take the views of the person in relation to whom
they are exercising the function into account when
making a decision on their behalf; (ii) restrict the
freedom of decision of the person as little as pos-
sible; and (iii) encourage, as far as possible, the
person to be self-reliant in matters relating to their
personal, domestic, and financial affairs.
The same is true in the Netherlands under the
Medical Treatment Contract Act (MTCA, 1995).
The surrogate decision maker is obligated to involve
the incompetent patient as much as possible in the
decision at hand. However, how this should be done
remains largely unclear, while on the other hand
the physician holds the responsibility to watch over
the surrogate to see whether he executes his role
properly as “a good representative.”
English case law stipulates a similar approach
(e.g., in the case of Bailey v Warren (2006)), while
the Mental Capacity Act (MCA, 2005a) prescribes
steps to support individuals with DMD in the
decision-making process in order for them to par-
ticipate maximally. Specifically, relating to the de-
termination of the best interest of individuals lack-
ing capacity, Section 4(4) of the MCA prescribes
that the person making the determination should
“as far as reasonably practicable, permit and en-
courage the relevant individual to participate, or to
improve his ability to participate, as fully as possible
in any act done for him and any decision affecting
him.”
Specific legislative authority for supported
decision-making has been also available in Alberta,
Canada since 2009. A person with DMD in per-
sonal decision-making, but with capacity to appoint
a “supporter,” can appoint one or two “supporter/s”
to assist themwhenmaking personal decisions. Sup-
port is provided by assisting with information collec-
tion, decision-making, and communicating the de-
cision, but not making the decision on behalf of the
person (Alberta Human Services, 2013). Similarly,
in Yukon, supported decision-making agreements
in regards to both personal and financial decisions
have been available since 2005 (Yukon Health and
Social Services, 2013).
Who should act as “supporter” and how should
they be appointed?
A range of supporters or assistants have been pro-
posed – from the obvious family members to volun-
teers and public advocates as well as those who have
interests in the individual’s care. Further, there has
been some variation in the nature of the appoint-
ments of the supporter. While most existing models
rely on self-appointment of assistants, there have
been proposals in some jurisdictions to externally
appoint the assistant, particularly if the person lacks
capacity to make the appointment.
Dutch law further distinguishes a so-called “un-
appointed surrogate”: If there is no self-appointed
surrogate decision maker and an externally appoin-
ted decision maker (external meaning appointed by
the court) is not available, the MTCA stipulates
whomight act as a surrogate decisionmaker (mostly
family or next of kin).
It is important to note that the capacity to
appoint a supporter or assistant decision maker
must be distinguished from the capacity to make
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decisions in the domain to be assisted (e.g., per-
sonal, health, or financial decisions). Usually, but
not always, the capacity task for appointing an as-
sistant would be less complex than making the
broader decisions (Kim and Appelbaum, 2006).
However, this may not be the case if the person
has a complex or conflictual social or family envir-
onment where the choice of who to choose and trust
may indeed be complex.
A stepwise and practical approach to a
collaborative model of supported
decision-making
From the foregoing discussion we may conclude
that there is ample statutory support for suppor-
ted decision-making, but also that the question of
“who” should act as a supporter is better addressed
than the question of “how” support in decision-
making can be given.
Aids to maximize participation
in decision-making
An important step in the process of supporting those
with DMD is the provision of aids to maximize par-
ticipation in decision-making. At a simple and gen-
eral level this can range from attending to barriers
to communication such as background noise, poor
lighting, flat hearing-aid batteries, addressing liter-
acy or language difficulties, tailoring and personal-
izing information, giving sufficient time for assim-
ilation of information, and using accessible visual
aids, to establishing rapport, creating a safe context,
and establishing a relationship of trust and empathy
(Parker and Cartwright, 2005). At a more specific
level, participation can be enhanced by buttressing
cognitive deficits, which might otherwise interfere
with decision-making. A useful starting point in do-
ing so is understanding the cognitive skills required
for decision-making using the operationalized defin-
ition of capacity, viz.:
1. Ability to understand and retain relevant informa-
tion.
2. Ability to appreciate the situation and its likely con-
sequence.
3. Ability to manipulate information rationally (or
reason about it) in a manner that allows one to
make comparisons and weigh options.
4. Ability to communicate a choice.
If we look at each of these elements, we find areas
that have been targeted to aid decision-making.
First, the ability of people with impaired capacity to
understand information relevant to their decision-
making can be enhanced in order to support their
decision-making. In fact, regardless of whether a
person has a DMD or not, the presentation of the
information about the health problems, treatments,
and choices available to the patient, i.e., “the educa-
tion step” (Darzins et al., 2000) is the first essential
step in decision-making. This concept is well set
out in the guidance provided by the MCA Code of
Practice in England and Wales on “how to support
people to make decisions for themselves, or play as
big a role as possible in decision-making” (Mental
Capacity Act, 2005b).
Second, in patients with a range of mental
and neurological disorders, interventions aimed
at maximizing understanding and appreciation by
supporting cognitive functions, such as memory,
may help to optimize capacity. Such efforts can
be fruitful even in patients who might other-
wise be deemed as lacking capacity. Simplified
explanations, repetition, and recognition cueing
have increased patient understanding of treatment
regimens in patients with schizophrenia, dementia,
and multiple sclerosis (Dunn & Jeste, 2001; Combs
et al., 2005; Moye et al., 2006; Palmer & Jeste,
2006; Basso et al., 2010).
The next focus of supported decision-making
is providing assistance with the rational manipu-
lation of information, considering the options avail-
able and the consequences of choosing each op-
tion (Victorian Law Reform Commission, 2012).
Frequently, the deficit in patients with DMD is
frontal or executive dysfunction, or more specific-
ally, deficits in abstract thought, the holding of
various options in one’s mind simultaneously and
projecting possible outcomes. Providing frontal or
executive dysfunction buttresses or scaffolding, us-
ing problem solving strategies, and making out-
comes concrete and explicit in a way accessible to
the person, can be helpful in this context (e.g., Rub-
right et al., 2010; Hamann et al., 2011). Another aid
to decision-making might be obtaining information
from written documents or family members about
the person’s former preferences, values, and beliefs,
which might be otherwise inaccessible to the per-
son due to frontal lobe or autobiographical memory
deficits (Hertogh, 2009).
Finally, there may be a need to assist the per-
son in communicating their wishes and decisions to
others and to advocate for the implementation of
their decisions, or to take action to ensure that their
decisions are respected and implemented (Victorian
Law Reform Commission, 2012).
A practical model
Under the acronym ASK ME, we recommend
the following steps for a model of supported
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decision-making that uses collaborative principles
and builds on a positive, relational concept of
autonomy:
Step 1. ASSESSwhere the person’s strengths and
deficits lie, whether it be in holding information in
working memory, weighing alternatives, projecting
and planning with consequences, or communicat-
ing. Having a supportive and flexible carer might be
a strength. Knowing where a person’s strengths and
weaknesses lie helps to determine exactly how best
to simplify/limit the task and maximize the ability to
understand.
Step 2. SIMPLIFY the task. Limit the capacity
task to the specific decision at hand and do not over-
state the decision. People are more likely to retain
or participate in decision-making for a simple, re-
stricted decision than a large, global decision. For
example, is the decision merely to give information
to an aged care team to organize care rather than
understand the need for care? Is it to express wishes
regarding desire for pain relief and comfort (i.e.,
participating in advance care planning) rather than
making an actual advance care directive? It is also
important to pitch the information provided at the
individual’s level of understanding, i.e., avoid med-
ical jargon and use straightforward sentences where
possible.
Step 3. KNOW the person. To find a common
ground for working together, it is essential to find
out what they consider of relevance in their life,
what their long held values are, and whether they
still affirm these values. Where possible, gain in-
formation about and understanding of their values
and/or past patterns of decision-making. Informa-
tion about past allegiances and trust might be evid-
ent in documents such as powers of attorney or
wills. This is particularly crucial if the person has a
degenerative disease and had decisional capacity
previously. In order to find a common ground, it
is essential to understand what is important and
meaningful to the person in their life right now as it
pertains (in any way) to the decision at hand (e.g.,
in a decision to decide about residential aged care,
the person may be more interested in food or family
than accommodation specifically). Respect the per-
son’s precedent autonomy where possible, but also,
where appropriate, respect their right to change
their mind (Jaworska, 1999; Hertogh, 2011).
Step 4. MAXIMIZE the ability to understand.
Attend to and remedy all hindering factors to com-
munication. Give time, optimize the environment,
simplify and concretize information, and provide it
in an accessible format, e.g., visual aids if necessary.
It is conceivable and probably more practical for
visual aids to encompass more than just written in-
formation, as written information is often complex,
difficult to read, and written in a way that decreases
understanding especially in people with a cognitive
and/or sensory deficit. Use of simple pictorial rep-
resentations of the choices or simple linear repres-
entations of the choices to be made would enhance
the contribution of the person making the decision.
Where possible, approach the individual at a time
when they are optimal in their cognition, e.g., first
thing in the morning or after a course of treatment
such as dialysis or blood transfusion.
Step 5. ENABLE, based on the (results of the)
former steps, participation in decision-making by
tailoring the degree of support to the complex-
ity of the decision and the seriousness of the
consequences of the decision. Assist and facilit-
ate the communication and implementation of the
decision.
Importantly, the ASK ME approach to suppor-
ted decision-making is not restricted to healthcare.
Similar principles apply in relation to decision-
making in legal settings as expressed in the rela-
tionship between the legal professional and their
client, and in financial settings in the relationship
between the accountant or financial advisor/planner
and their client. Further, as said, the essence of col-
laboration is to find a common ground for work-
ing together while understanding the person, their
strengths, and weaknesses. As a consequence of this
principle, the effect of the ASKME approach might
be that the problem to be decided on is rephrased or
reframed during the process or a person is reminded
of or cued about previous decisions. Another effect
might be a true medico-legal or medico-financial
collaboration where healthcare professionals assist
other professionals in the understanding of the
person.
Risks, problems, and limitations
There are a range of problems and risks related to
supported decision-making. An important practical
impediment is the time constraint faced by prac-
titioners in their busy clinical settings. Also, the
model proposed here would be impractical when
the patient is in an emergency and in need of imme-
diate treatment. Further, this approach to decision-
making calls for an active role of health professionals
and high quality communicative skills. Collabora-
tion asks for attentive listening, responsivity, and
other competencies, for otherwise patients will eas-
ily be overruled. It demands true willingness and
preparedness to see the patient as a partner in the
decision-making process, and to encourage and pre-
serve patient ownership of decisions as much as
possible.
Among the hazards we must mention the risk
of overestimating a person’s capacity. Specifically in
the context of impaired executive function, patients
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1041610213001014
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Southern Queensland, on 06 Apr 2017 at 22:51:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Guest editorial 1577
may be substantially controlled by verbal and beha-
vioral cues and clinicians can thus easily induce ac-
ceptance of a care plan or other decision (Workman
et al., 2000). This places a huge responsibility on the
shoulders of healthcare professionals and calls for a
scrupulous, preferably multidisciplinary, team ap-
proach in which clinical, neuro-psychological, and
ethical competencies are combined. Patients, or
those supporting them, may be vulnerable to the
influence or skewed perceptions of those who seek
to gain from the decision at hand. Indeed, there may
be certain complex situations which preclude sup-
ported decision-making. For example, adopting a
truly non-partisan approach may be difficult in the
face of family conflict when choosing to appoint or
benefit a family member over others is the decision
at stake.
The reverse dilemma, namely of underestimating
a person’s capacity, can arise in relation to Advance
Directives/Decisions where the question is raised
how to accommodate for the problem of preference
adaptation in view of a former advance treatment re-
fusal. Indeed, as stated above, people have “a right
to change their mind, even when their minds have
changed” as a consequence of a neurodegenerative
disease. Generally speaking however, the dilemma
remains on how to judge the authenticity of such
changes. The Dutch MTCA as well as the Eng-
lish and Welsh MCA hold that Advance Direct-
ives/Decisions to Refuse Treatment, when valid and
applicable to the current circumstances,must be fol-
lowed. Both statutes however make allowance for
instances in future when the healthcare professional
might have justified reasons not to follow the dic-
tates of the Advance Directives/Decision, thereby
acknowledging that our lived reality is much more
complex than the simplicity of written Advance Dir-
ectives/Decisions. In essence, it is not always pos-
sible to make all-inclusive decisions about the future
based on current experiences (Hertogh, 2011). In-
deed, it must be recognized that there is no easy
way out of the dilemma generated by the conflict
between past and present wishes. Nonetheless, as
far as our efforts are directed toward equal recog-
nition for people with DMD by affording them op-
timal agency in supportive decision-making, it is our
position that we prefer to “err on the side of life”
in case of a discrepancy between a current patient’s
preference and his former Treatment Refusal.
In conclusion, by and large the supported
decision-making concept requires the healthcare (or
legal and financial) professional to involve patients
as much as possible in decisions relating to their
care and treatment/welfare regardless of their areas
of deficit. This concept is supported by several
jurisdictions around the world. Although there are
numerous limitations to this concept and its applic-
ability, some of which are enumerated above, we
consider the supported decision-making concept to
be the best way forward inmaximizing autonomy for
patients with dementia and other capacity-limiting
disorders and recommend the ASK ME approach.
For as one of them, Cary Henderson (1998, p.
7), denotes in his autobiography: “Damn it we’re
people too! And we want to be talked to and re-
spected as if we were honest to God real people.”
We recommend greater utilization of this concept
in the global context.
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